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I. INTRODUCTION
Ultimately, Federal supremacy will prevail and the State of Nevada will be
the home of the nation's first deep geologic repository for high-level radioac-
tive waste.' Pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, the Department
of Energy (DOE) has been studying Yucca Mountain, Nevada, for the past
twenty years in an attempt to close the nuclear fuel cycle.2 Reacting to the
DOE's interest in Yucca Mountain, Nevada has waged an intense political bat-
tle in an effort to resist becoming the country's dumping ground. Nevada's
weak political stature has prompted the state to take its fight to the courts.
Nevada, acting through its state officers, has unsuccessfully attacked the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act on the grounds that it violates the Federal Enclave
Clause, the Equal Footing Doctrine, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the
Tenth Amendment, and even the Port Preference Clause.3 However, the State
has successfully pestered the Department of Energy over water rights.
Nevada, the driest state in the nation,4 has played a significant role in develop-
ing water law doctrines that have shaped federal versus state sovereignty in the
western United States.5 Nevada is currently pitting more than a century's
worth of congressional deference to state water law against America's national,
energy, and homeland security policies, as well as the nation's need to protect
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Admittedly this note addresses only one area of controversy between the State of Nevada
and the United States Department of Energy. However, while this statement may be over-
broad when considering other litigation over Yucca Mountain, the author believes that the
statement is nonetheless correct.
2 See Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545, 1549 (9th Cir. 1990). The court provides the
following summary of the nuclear fuel cycle:
Although the AEC, and its successor agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), were
largely successful in promoting the construction of commercial nuclear reactors, these agencies
were not successful in resolving the need for safe disposal of the by-products of the generation of
nuclear energy.
3 Id. at 1554-57.
4 Senator Harry Reid, Homepage, Interesting Facts, available at http://reid.senate.govl
nvfacts.cfm (last visited May 12, 2004); Sylvia Harrison, The Historical Development of
Nevada Water Law, 5 U. DENY. WATER L. REV. 148 (2001).
1 Harrison, supra note 4, at 178-80.
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the environment through safe underground storage of nuclear waste. While
Nevada may be able to use water rights to delay and harass the Department of
Energy's work at Yucca Mountain, the federal government will ultimately pre-
vail. The Department of Energy has three legal theories, all tied to preemption,
by which to defeat Nevada's delay tactics.
Part II of this Note briefly discusses the events leading up to Nevada's
conflict with the Department of Energy over water. Part III reviews water
rights litigation between Nevada and the Department of Energy, as well as
changes in Yucca Mountain's status that foreshadow further litigation results.
Part IV applies the federal reserved rights doctrine to Yucca Mountain and Part
V addresses the applicability of the controversial federal non-reserved rights
doctrine.
The final outcome of Yucca Mountain is inevitable. Until a dynamic and
courageous political leader stands up and acknowledges what many Nevadans
already know, Nevada will continue to waste taxpayer resources and miss
opportunities to salvage benefits for the state.6
II. BACKGROUND
In 1982, Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA), which
serves as the nation's long-term plan for nuclear waste disposal.7 When origi-
nally enacted, the NWPA provided guidelines for the Secretary of Energy to
select five potential locations for site characterization. 8 In 1987, Congress
amended the NWPA to select Yucca Mountain, Nevada, as the sole site for
characterization.9 This designation sparked intense opposition by the state.1 °
6 See, e.g., Keith Rogers, Nuclear Waste: Making Deal on Yucca Gains Favor, LAS VEGAS
REv.-J., July 21, 2002, available at http://www.reviewjoumal.comllvrj-home/2002/Jul-21-
Sun-2002/news/19219009.html (last visited May 12, 2004), quoting former Nevada Gover-
nor Robert List on results of opinion poll:
They are saying inevitability is coming into focus, and we think it is a mistake to waste our tax
dollars by giving the money to attorneys. Let's get real .... They're saying the time has come to
be practical. Our state has tremendous needs. This is a massive project that could mean
thousands of good jobs and put hundreds of millions of dollars into our economy. We're crazy if
we get all of the bad and none of the good.
See also Jane Ann Morrison, Yucca Mountain: Ex-Governor Promotes Nuke Dump, LAS
VEGAS REv.-J., Aug. 16, 2001, available at http://www.reviewjoumal.comllvrj homel2001/
Aug-16-Thu-2001/news/16781115.html (last visited May 12, 2004).
7 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101-10270 (2000).
8 42 U.S.C. § 10132(b)(l)(A) (2000).
9 42 U.S.C. § 10133(c)(3)(A)-(F); 42 U.S.C. § 10101(21). The term "site characterization"
means -
(A) siting research activities with respect to a test and evaluation facility at a candidate site; and
(B) activities, whether in the laboratory or in the field, undertaken to establish the geologic
condition and the ranges of the parameters of a candidate site relevant to the location of a reposi-
tory, including borings, surface excavations, excavations of exploratory shafts, limited subsur-
face lateral excavations and borings, and in situ testing needed to evaluate the suitability of a
candidate site for the location of a repository, but not including preliminary borings and geo-
physical testing needed to assess whether site characterization should be undertaken.
t See, e.g., Cinnamon Gilbreath, Federalism in the Context of Yucca Mountain: Nevada v.
Department of Energy, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 577 (2000) ("[D]esignation of Yucca Mountain,
Nevada as the sole site to be considered for a nuclear waste repository instigated a fierce and
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In response to the 1987 NWPA amendment, the State enacted Nevada Revised
Statute 459.910, prohibiting the storage of high level radioactive waste in
Nevada." Nevada claimed that this legislation was the equivalent of a legisla-
tive veto of the DOE's site characterization activities.1 2 However, in Nevada v.
Watkins, the Ninth Circuit held that "Nevada's attempted legislative veto of the
Secretary's site characterization activities is preempted by the NWPA."' 3 The
court further held that Nevada's legislation "stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. '"14
This would not be the end of Nevada Revised Statute 459.910, however.
Under Nevada water law, anyone trying to appropriate water in the state must
apply to the State Engineer1 5 for a permit setting forth the uses of the water, the
point of diversion, and the place of use. 6 In February 2000, the Nevada State
Engineer resurrected Nevada Revised Statute 459.910 by' using it to deny the
DOE's application for temporary water permits. The events preceding the
application denial began in July 1997, when the DOE filed five applications
with the State Engineer to replace existing temporary permits and to establish
permanent uses should Congress and the President of the United States desig-
nate Yucca Mountain as a nuclear waste repository.' 7
Nevada law limits the State Engineer's discretion to deny an application
for water to three criteria.' 8 A permit may be denied if: 1) no unappropriated
water exists at the proposed supply source; 2) the use would conflict with
existing rights; and 3) the proposed use threatens to be detrimental to the public
interest.19 In extensive public hearings, both the State and the DOE stipulated
that there was sufficient water to be appropriated. 20 Furthermore, no one
presented a conflicting right. 2 1 This left the State Engineer with one option to
deny the water permits: the potential threat to the public interest.22 The State
continuing political war between the state of Nevada and the Department of Energy.");
Martha Adams & Andrea Nichols, The Yucca Mountain Fight Is Far from Over, 10 NEV.
LAW. 26 (2002) ("Perhaps it's time to remind the public that 'the opera ain't over 'til the fat
lady sings.' With respect to a nuclear dump at Yucca Mountain, the fat lady hasn't sung and
the decision is far from inevitable.").
" Gilbreath, supra, note 10, at 588; NEv. REV. STAT. 459.910 (2002) stating: "1) It is
unlawful for any person or governmental entity to store high-level radioactive waste in
Nevada," and "2) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires, 'high-level
radioactive waste' has the meaning ascribed to that term in 10 C.F.R. § 60.2."
12 Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545, 1560 (9th Cir. 1990).
13 Id., at 1561.
14 Id.
1' NEV. REV. STAT. 532.010, 532.110 (Nevada uses a State Engineer to administer the
state's water regulations).
16 NEV. REV. STAT. 534.080, 533.325, 533.335.
17 THIEL ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS, NUMERICAL MODELING OF GROUNDWATER FLOW IN
THE DEATH VALLEY HYDROGRAPHIC REGION: BASINS 225-230 § 2.1.1 (2000).
1" NEV. REV. STAT. 533.370(3) (2002).
19 Id.; see also D. Craig Bell & Norman K. Johnson, State Water Laws and Federal Water
Uses: The History of Conflict, The Prospects for Accommodation, 21 ENVTL. L. 1, 7 (1991)
(stating that several states include mandatory public interest analysis in approving water
rights).
20 United States v. Morros, 268 F.3d 695, 698 (9th Cir. 2001).
21 Id.
22 Id.
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Engineer argued that Nevada Revised Statute 459.910 was a legislative mani-
festation that the storage of high level nuclear waste in Nevada is detrimental to
the public interest. 23 Once again, the State of Nevada attempted to veto the
NWPA through use of Revised Statute 459.910. Several recent developments
signal that the state law will again be preempted.
Notably, the Department of Energy's position was strengthened in 2002
by presidential and congressional action. On February 14, 2002, the Secretary
of Energy, Spencer Abraham, recommended Yucca Mountain to the President
for development of a nuclear waste repository. 4 The next day, President
George W. Bush recommended Yucca Mountain to Congress as the site for the
nation's first geologic repository.2 ' As expected, the Governor of Nevada sub-
mitted a notice of disapproval to Congress within sixty days of the President's
recommendation. 26 On July 9, 2002, after four hours of debate, the United
States Senate followed the lead of the House of Representatives and passed a
joint resolution, which overrode (vetoed) Nevada's notice of disapproval.2 7 On
July 23, the President signed the bill into law, which officially designated
Yucca Mountain as the location for a repository. 8
III. FEDERAL PREEMPTION
In March of 2000, the DOE filed a complaint in United States District
Court for the District of Nevada. Similar to the argument made in Watkins, the
complaint alleged that Nevada Revised Statute 459.910 "as applied by the State
23 Id.
24 Letter from Spencer Abraham, Secretary of Energy, to George W. Bush, President,
United States of America (Feb. 14, 2002), at http://www.ocrwm.doe.gov/ymp/sr/salp.pdf
(last visited May 12, 2004).
25 Letter from George W. Bush, President, United States of America, to Congress (Feb. 15,
2002), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20O20215-10.html (last visited
May 12, 2004); see also 42 U.S.C. § 10136(b)(2) stating:
Upon the submission by the President to the Congress of a recommendation of a site for a
repository, the Governor or legislature of the State in which such site is located may disapprove
the site designation and submit to the Congress a notice of disapproval. Such Governor or legis-
lature may submit such a notice of disapproval to the Congress not later than the 60 days after
the date that the President recommends such site to the Congress under section 10134 of this
title. A notice of disapproval shall be considered to be submitted to the Congress on the date of
the transmittal of such notice of disapproval to the Speaker of the House and the President pro
tempore of the Senate. Such notice of disapproval shall be accompanied by a statement of rea-
sons explaining why such Governor or legislature disapproved the recommended repository site
involved.
26 Press Release, Governor Kenny Guinn, Nevada Governor Guinn Declares "The Battle
Begins" as He Vetoes Yucca Mountain Nuclear Dump Recommendation (Apr. 8, 2002), at
http://gov.state.nv.us/pr/2002/4-8YUC.htm (last visited May 12, 2004).
27 H.R.J. Res. 87, 107th Cong.; Pub. L. No. 107-200, 116 Stat. 735 (2002):
Approving the Site at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, for the development of a repository for the
disposal of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel, pursuant to the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act of 1982.
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in
Congress Assembled, That there hereby is approved the site at Yucca Mountain, Nevada,
for a repository, with respect to which a notice of disapproval was submitted by the Gover-
nor of the State of Nevada on April 8, 2002.
28 Id.
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Engineer, stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the purposes of the
NWPA and is therefore preempted under the Supremacy Clause."'29 At first
glance, the Watkins decision appears dispositive of the state's delay tactics.3"
However, the complaint was dismissed in September 2000 by the district court,
which abstained from deciding the preemption issue.3 In United States v.
Morros, the district court's decision to dismiss the claim was vacated and
remanded by the appellate panel by a vote of two to three.32 Both the majority
and dissent focused much of their opinions on the issues of jurisdiction and
abstention.33 However, both judicial views provide insight on the issue of
preemption.
A. UNITED STATES V. MORROS - MAJORITY OPINION
With regard to preemption, the majority opinion focused on two issues.
The first was the purpose of the DOE's water permit applications. The second
issue was the extent of Nevada's authorized participation in deciding whether
to site a nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain.
The five applications submitted by the DOE indicated that the water uses
would include, but not be limited to "road construction, facility construction,
drilling, dust suppression, tunnel and pad construction, testing, culinary,
domestic and other related site uses."3 4 During the water application hearings,
a DOE witness stated that "if Congress ultimately designated Yucca Mountain
as a nuclear waste repository, the requested water would be used to construct
and operate such a facility in addition to the purposes listed on the applica-
tions."35 This is the critical difference between Watkins and Morros. The
water permits in Watkins were for site characterization activities only, whereas
the disputed permits in Morros also included construction and operation activi-
ties. In Watkins, the court held that Nevada Revised Statute 459.910 was pre-
empted because the state enacted the statute to legislatively veto site
characterization activities authorized by the NWPA.36
Because Yucca Mountain had not been designated at the time the DOE
applied for water permits, the State Engineer claimed that the activities related
to constructing and operating a repository were premature. 37 The State Engi-
neer based his ruling on the conclusion that the DOE was requesting water for
the "actual use in the receiving, transfer, and processes for the storage of high-
level nuclear waste in Nevada.' 38 "Because the Yucca Mountain repository
29 United States v. Morros, 268 F.3d 695, 699 (9th Cir. 2001).
30 See id. at 697 ("Realizing that the current water permits expire in April 2002 and that
obtaining new permits would take time, the Department of Energy ("DOE") filed five permit
applications with Nevada's State Engineer in 1997.").
31 United States v. Nevada, 123 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (D. Nev. 2000).
32 Morros, 268 F.3d at 709.
33 For a detailed examination on the Court's treatment of abstention, see Kevin Beck, The
Ninth Circuit's Message to Nevada: You're Not Getting Any Younger, 3 NEV. L.J. 592
(2003).
34 Morros, 268 F.3d at 698.
35 Id.
36 Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545, 1561 (9th Cir. 1990).
31 Morros, 268, F.3d at 711.
38 Id. at 698.
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ha[d] not been approved by Congress, the State... persistently maintained that
the United States' claim of federal preemption is premature and that the DOE
has sufficient water under permit to continue with its authorized site characteri-
zation activities."3 9 The State of Nevada used this timing argument to extend
the already lengthy four-year water permit application process.4 ° Since
Nevada's formal notice of disapproval was overridden and Yucca Mountain has
been designated by Congress, 41 the State of Nevada's argument about preemp-
tion being premature is now moot. If decided today, the Morros court would
most likely follow Watkins and hold that Nevada Revised Statute 459.910
stands as an obstacle to the furtherance of the NWPA and is, therefore, pre-
empted under the Supremacy Clause.42
The second preemption issue in Morros was whether the federal govern-
ment or Nevada is entitled to decide if a high level radioactive waste repository
should be located in Nevada. According to the court, the outcome is dependent
on the interpretation of the NWPA.43 If the act is interpreted to "explicitly or
implicitly" authorize only the federal government "to determine whether siting
a nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain is in the public interest, 44 then
the United States will prevail."45 In contrast, the United States will lose if the
NWPA is interpreted to include state participation beyond the "notice of disap-
proval process" outlined in 42 U.S.C § 10136.46 The court did not decide this
issue but provided some insight as to how the question should be decided.
The court stated: "[t]he NWPA's purpose was to establish 'the Federal
responsibility[ ] and definite Federal policy' for the disposal of radioactive
waste and to 'define the relationship between the Federal Government and the
State governments' with respect to this problem. '47 The court found these pur-
poses persuasive with regard to the United States' claim that Nevada Revised
Statute 459.910 was preempted, especially when combined with the specific
method of state participation required by 42 U.S.C. § 10136.48 Even before
Yucca Mountain was designated as a repository, the court found that Nevada
39 Adams & Nichols, supra, note 10 (Martha Adams is a Nevada Deputy Attorney General,
co-author of The Yucca Mountain Fight is Far From Over, counsel for the State of Nevada
in United States v. Nevada, 123 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1210 (D. Nev. 2000), and counsel for the
Nevada Agency for Nuclear Projects in United States v. Morros, 268 F.3d 695 (9th Cir.
2001)).
40 Morros, 268 F.3d at 697.
4' H.R.J. Res. 87, 107th Cong., Pub. L. No. 107-200, 116 Stat. 735 (2002).
42 Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545, 1561 (9th Cir. 1990).
43 Morros, 268 F.3d at 700.
44 Letter from Spencer Abraham, Secretary of Energy, to George W. Bush, President,
United States of America (Feb. 14, 2002), at http://www.ocrwm.doe.gov/ymp/sr/salp.pdf
(last visited May 12, 2004) (stating "there are compelling national interests that require
development of a repository" - "national security," "non-proliferation objectives," "energy
security," and "homeland security"); See also Letter from George W. Bush, President,
United States of America, to Congress (Feb. 15, 2002), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2002/02/20020215-10.html (last visited May 12, 2004) ("Proceeding with the repos-
itory is necessary to protect the public safety, health, and the Nation's security.
45 Morros, 268 F.3d at 700.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 702 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 10131(b)(2) & (3)).
48 Id. at 701-02.
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law would nevertheless be preempted to the extent that it conflicts with the
NWPA. In effect, Nevada Revised Statute 459.910 attempts to decide an issue
at the local level that the NWPA outlines taking place at the federal level.
The NWPA details the method for the state to express its disapproval.4 9
The state has followed the procedure. Congress, in accordance with the
NWPA, overrode the state's disapproval. To allow the state to discard the site
designation at this stage would usurp congressional authority as outlined in the
NWPA. The NWPA clearly does not outline the extensive process in Section
10136 so that the state may thwart site designation by reliance on water law
that declares deliberate congressional intent detrimental to the public interest.
B. UNITED STATES V. MORROS - DISSENT
Judge Hug 5 ° stated in his dissent that "an Act which Congress has not yet
passed cannot preempt state law or state agency decisions."'" Judge Hug
agreed with the State Engineer's denial of water permits on the basis that the
NWPA did not yet authorize all of the uses of water included in the applica-
tions. Authorization to construct and operate a repository at Yucca Mountain
required a congressional act.5 2 Judge Hug indicated, however, that if the DOE
were to resubmit its applications limited to activities necessary to continue the
evaluation of Yucca Mountain, "the State Engineer could not refuse" to
approve the permits on the basis of Nevada Revised Statute 459.910.
53
The additional act of Congress required by Justice Hug at the time of the
Morros opinion has since occurred. The DOE no longer must present a revised
application that limits the uses of water to those outlined by the NWPA for site
characterization. Rather, the DOE can include the uses necessary to develop a
nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain.
C. Subsequent History
On November 27, 2002, the United States filed a motion for summary
judgment.54 The relief sought included declaratory and permanent injunctive
relief based largely on the preemptive effect of Congress' designation of Yucca
Mountain as a repository site.5 5 Unfortunately, because the potable water sup-
ply was being exhausted, the DOE could not patiently wait for the resolution of
the summary judgment motion.56 On December 3, 2002, based on the DOE's
desperate need for additional water, the United States filed a Renewed Motion
for Preliminary Injunction to prevent the State of Nevada from interfering with
the DOE's withdrawal of water for use at Yucca Mountain.5 7
49 42 U.S.C. § 10136.
50 Judge Hug, the only dissenter, is from Nevada. (United States Courts for the Ninth Cir-
cuit website is located at http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/) (last visited May 12, 2004).
51 Morros, 268 F.3d at 711.
52 Id.
51 Id.; Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545, 1561 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that Nevada
Revised Statute 459.910 was preempted by the NWPA).
54 Memorandum for the United States at 2, United States v. Nevada, No. CV-S-00-268-
RLH-(LRL) (D. Nev. 2002).
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
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In response to this motion, counsel for the Nevada State Engineer con-
tacted the United States on December 13, 2002 to discuss the potential for
settling the potable water "crisis."58 By December 18, the State Engineer, the
State of Nevada Agency for Nuclear Projects, and the United States had
reached an agreement.59 The next day, the parties filed a Joint Stipulation and
Motion to Vacate Hearing. 60 The stipulation allowed the DOE to immediately
start pumping water for potable needs at Yucca Mountain. 61 The only restric-
tions on the DOE's water withdrawal are the requirements to provide the State
Engineer with forty-eight hours advance notice before refilling the potable
water tanks and using austerity measures to ensure that potable water is not
wasted.62
D. State Engineer's Ruling
The Ninth Circuit in Morros remanded the case to the federal district court
for a decision on the merits. 63 The federal district court remanded, to the
Nevada State Engineer, the issue of whether the use of water applied for under
the DOE's applications would threaten to be detrimental to the public inter-
est.' In Ruling Number 5307, the State Engineer again relied on discretionary
provisions of Nevada Revised Statute 533.370(3), stating "that the use of the
waters ... as contemplated under the said applications would threaten to prove
detrimental to the public interest. "65 This conclusion was based on the Gover-
nor's notice of disapproval. 66 The State Engineer concluded that, as the
supreme executive in Nevada, the Governor's actions were a manifestation of a
public interest. 67 However, on remand, the federal district court stated:
while there may be evidence, or argument, available from the prior hearings which
address the economic and/or environmental impact of the repository, that mere state-
ments and opinions by state officials will not suffice. Under the circumstances, there
must be evidence supplied by experts to substantiate any finding and conclusion by
the State Engineer.
6 8
The State Engineer's ruling completely failed to respond with anything
other than "mere statements" and "opinions" by state officials. The State Engi-
neer unpersuasively suggested that the action by the Governor was not a "mere
statement," but rather expressed the overwhelming opposition of the residents
of Nevada. 69 However, in July 2002, the Las Vegas Review-Journal conducted
58 Joint Stipulation and Motion to Vacate Hearing at 2, United States v. Nevada, No. CV-S-
00-268-RLH-(LRL) (D. Nev. 2002).
59 Id.
6 id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 2-3.
63 United States v. Morros, 268 F.3d 695, 709 (9th Cir. 2001).
64 Nevada State Engineer Ruling No. 5307, Dated November 7, 2003, at http://water.
nv.gov/O&R/Rulings/5307r.pdf (last visited on May 12, 2004) (on file with the Nevada Law
Journal).
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
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an opinion poll that found only forty-nine percent7 ° of those surveyed believed
Nevada should continue to fight Yucca Mountain. 71 The State Engineer has
not offered any evidence from experts to substantiate a claim that the DOE's
use of water at Yucca Mountain is detrimental to the public interest. Addition-
ally, accepting this argument would have the effect of vetoing Yucca Mountain,
in contradiction of the notice of disapproval process outlined in the NWPA. As
discussed above, permitting a second veto opportunity would stand as an obsta-
cle to the NWPA and would allow a decision at the local level that was contem-
plated to take place at the national level.
E. Summary
In Morros, both the majority and dissent were quite aware of the fact that
Yucca Mountain had not been designated by Congress and the President. Even
with this limitation, the two opinions discussed how the DOE would be suc-
cessful in obtaining approval of its water permits. Based on the change in
Yucca Mountain's status - now a designated site for a nuclear waste repository
- the DOE preemption arguments will prevail. The recent out-of-court settle-
ment and the State Engineer's ruling have only temporarily delayed the inevita-
ble federal versus state conflict.
IV. FEDERAL RESERVED RIGHTS DOCTRINE
In addition to the preemption argument, the Department of Energy could
pursue acquisition of water rights via a declaratory judgment on the basis of
federal reserved rights. The doctrine of federal reserved water rights is an
exception to an extensive pattern of deference by the federal government to
state regulation of water within their boundaries.7 2
The federal reserved rights doctrine slowly evolved over the course of the
twentieth century. The arid nature of the western United States requires irriga-
tion to "reclaim" the land from the desert. 73 The need to irrigate arid, non-
riparian land and claims to water for mining purposes gave rise to the appropri-
ation doctrine.7 ' The appropriation doctrine, simply stated, is "first in time,
first in right." Appropriation "requires (1) an intent to appropriate; (2) notice of
the appropriation; (3) compliance with state laws; (4) a diversion of the water
from a natural stream; and (5) its application, with reasonable diligence and
within a reasonable time, to a beneficial use."' 75 Because water is limited in the
western United States, there are often more uses for the water than available
supply. The reserved rights doctrine allows the federal government to obtain a
70 While forty-nine percent is nearly half of the number surveyed, it does not establish the
overwhelming opposition cited by the State Engineer.
71 Rogers, supra note 6.
72 Gila River III, 989 P.2d 739, 747 (Ariz. 1999).
73 See generally California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978) (discussing the develop-
ment of the appropriation doctrine and reclamation).
74 Harrison, supra note 4, at 153.
75 GEORGE A. GOULD & DOUGLAS L. GRANT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON WATER LAW 27
(West Group 2000).
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water right with a priority going back to the date of the land reservation,
regardless of whether the water has been put to a beneficial use.
The doctrine of reserved rights had its beginning in United States v. Rio
Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., which was decided in 1899.76 In Rio Grande,
the court found that "a State cannot by its legislation destroy the right of the
United States, as the owner of lands bordering on a stream, to the continued
flow of its waters; so far at least as may be necessary for the beneficial uses of
the government property."7 7 The federal reserved rights doctrine was next seen
in the context of Indian reservation land.78 In Winters v. United States, the
court found that when the federal government signed a treaty with the Gros
Ventre and Assiniboing Indians and reserved the land, the water necessary for
the reservation was also impliedly reserved.79 Specifically, the reservation was
for agriculture, and the land would have no value to the Indians without
water.80
Furthermore, in Cappaert v. United States, the court noted: "[t]his court
has long held that when the Federal Government withdraws its land from the
public domain and reserves it for a federal purpose, the Government, by impli-
cation, reserves appurtenant water then unappropriated to the extent needed to
accomplish the purpose of the reservation."8 The court went on to state that
"[in so doing the United States acquires a reserved right in unappropriated
water which vests on the date of the reservation and is superior to the rights of
future appropriators."8
Arizona v. California was the first case to expressly apply the reserved
rights doctrine to non-Indian reservation land. 83 Since Arizona, a number of
cases have sought to limit the reach of the federal government's reserved right.
In United States v. New Mexico, the Supreme Court found that reserved rights
only apply to the primary purpose for which the land was reserved.84 Water
uses for secondary purposes would have to be acquired through state regulatory
channels.85
There is still some debate as to whether reserved rights apply to ground-
water. In Big Horn I, the Wyoming Supreme Court expressly held "that the
reserved water doctrine does not extend to groundwater."8 6 In Shamberger v.
United States,8 7 the United States District Court for the District of Nevada held
76 United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
77 Id. at 703.
78 Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
79 Id. at 575-77.
80 Id. at 576.
81 Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976).
82 Id.
83 Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963) ("The Master ruled that the principle
underlying the reservation of water rights for Indian Reservations was equally applicable to
other federal establishments such as National Recreations Areas and National Forests. We
agree with the conclusions of the Master ... ").
84 United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 718 (1978).
85 Id. at 716.
86 In re Big Horn River System, 753 P.2d 76, 99-100 (Wyo. 1988).
87 Shamberger v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 600, 610-11 (D. Nev. 1958), stating:
Here it is sought to compel the United States to obtain permits to use water from Wells that the
United States itself has dug .... on property to which it has had "full title" at all times since the
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that the United States clearly possessed an implied right to the groundwater
necessary for the purposes of the naval reservation even though the legislation
reserving the land contained no provisions for water rights. 88
The Arizona Supreme Court found that whether the water was on the sur-
face or in the ground was irrelevant.8 9 It reasoned that "if the United States
implicitly intended, when it established reservations, to reserve sufficient unap-
propriated water to meet the reservations' needs, it must have intended that
reservation water to come from whatever particular sources each reservation
had at hand."90
Because the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Arizona
case, a clear judicial ruling on the reserved rights doctrine's application to
groundwater is lacking.9 ' However, the Supreme Court did touch upon the
groundwater issue in Cappaert.92 In that case, the heavy pumping of well
water lowered the water level of a unique cavern pool in Death Valley called
Devil's Hole.9 3 While the court found the pool to be surface water, it did limit
the groundwater that could be pumped by nearby ranchers in order to reserve
the minimum amount of water necessary to protect the pup fish, which was the
reason the land was originally reserved.94
In Federal Power Commission v. Oregon, often referred to as Pelton
Dam, the State of Oregon argued that the Desert Land Act severed water from
the public domain and gave the states regulatory control over the water.95 The
court in Pelton Dam held that the Desert Land Act was inapplicable to reserved
land.96 The Pelton Dam case, under the Power Act, defined public lands and
reserved lands. Land subject to disposal and private appropriation under public
land law are public lands. In contrast, reserved land is not subject to such
disposal and appropriation. 97
The following similar definition of the "public domain" is provided by W.
Douglas Kari in his note: "[p]ublic land, sometimes called the 'public domain,'
is land owned by the federal government which remains open to settlement,
sale, or disposition under the public land laws." 98 A reservation of land can be
cession of the land by Mexico in 1848.... In the instant case, the United States is not seeking
freedom to arrange for services to be performed for it by others. It is merely insisting that it has
the right to perform its own services on its own land and use the water obtained by means of
such services, without being compelled to seek a permit from the State "to appropriate to benefi-
cial use the waters of each of said wells."
88 E. Brendan Shane, Water Rights and Gila River III: The Winters Doctrine Goes Under-
ground, 4 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 397, 403 (2001).
89 Gila River III, 989 P.2d 739, 747 (Ariz. 1999) ("The significant question for the purpose
of the reserved rights doctrine is not whether the water runs above or below the ground but
whether it is necessary to accomplish the purpose of the reservation.").
90 Id.
91 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1250 (2000).
92 Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
93 Id. at 131-34.
94 Id. at 142-43.
9' Fed. Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 448 (1955).
96 Id.
97 Id. at 443-44.
98 Id. at 443-44; see also W. Douglas Kari, Groundwater Rights on Public Land in Califor-
nia, 35 HASTINGs L.J. 1007 (1984).
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completed via approval of the Secretary of the Interior,99 via executive
order, 1 o or by congressional act.'o'
Analyzing the reserved rights doctrine with regard to Yucca Mountain
requires a discussion of the mountain's land status. Additionally, a close look
at the purpose of the NWPA concerning water is necessary to determine
whether an express or implied reservation exists.
Yucca Mountain is situated on three different pieces of property. Roughly
a third of the mountain is located on Nevada Test Site land. Another third is
located on Air Force test range land. The final third is located on Bureau of
Land Management property. The source of water for Yucca Mountain falls
within the Nevada Test Site borders. The State of Nevada could argue that
using water for Yucca Mountain from the Nevada Test Site is a secondary
purpose of the Nevada Test Site and, therefore, not a reserved right. In the case
of Yucca Mountain, Congress has approved the site as the location for a reposi-
tory. The land has not be formally withdrawn and reserved from the public
domain, but the reserved rights doctrine is a doctrine based on implication.X°"
Clearly, designating a location as the site for 70,000 metric tons of high-level
radioactive waste removes the land from the public domain. Similar to Pelton
Dam, this land is not available for disposal or subject to private appropriation
according to public land law. To designate the land as the site for the nation's
first geologic repository means little without the resources (water) necessary to
fulfill the purposes of the designation.
According the Morros court, "Yucca Mountain . . .activities require
water."1 0 3 In enacting the NWPA, Congress expressly identified what the Sec-
retary of Energy must consider when acquiring water. The NWPA, as codified
in 42 U.S.C. § 10144 states:
The Secretary shall give full consideration to whether the development, construction,
and operation of a repository may require any purchase or other acquisition of water
rights that will have a significant adverse effect on the present or future development
of the area in which such repository is located. The Secretary shall mitigate any such
adverse effects to the maximum extent practicable.
This section of the NWPA makes it clear that a repository site requires
water. There is no mention of acquisition of water rights via state procedures.
Rather, the Secretary's duty is to ensure that the acquisition of water rights has
99 See, e.g., Act of June 25, 1910, 36 Stat. 855, 858 (Reservation for dam site by the Secre-
tary of Interior in Federal Power Commission v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 439 n.5 (1955)).
'00 See, e.g., Proclamation No. 2,961, 3 C.F.R 147 (1949 - 1953 Comp.) (Proclamation
used to withdraw Devil's Hole from the public domain and make it a detached part of Death
Valley); see also Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 131 (1976).
'o' See, e.g., United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 699 (1978).
102 Traditionally, the threshold question for a reserved water right is whether the Federal
Government has in fact withdrawn and reserved the land. Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 138. Find-
ing a reserved water right without a formal withdrawal and reservation would represent an
extension of current law. However, modern withdrawals have less significance today than
when the Winter's doctrine was established in the early twentieth century. This Note sug-
gests that designating Yucca Mountain as the site for a high-level waste repository has the
same function as a formal withdrawal and reservation. Although, a formal withdrawal and
reservation of land and water at Yucca Mountain would remove any uncertainty as to the
DOE's water right.
103 United States v. Morros, 268 F.3d 695, 697 (9th Cir. 2001).
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no adverse consequences. In the public hearings leading up the denial of the
DOE's applications, the State stipulated that sufficient unappropriated water
was available. Therefore, the DOE is not limited due to prior appropriations.
No one came forward with a conflicting claim, so there was no showing of
adverse effects. Additionally, studies performed at the on-site wells confirm
that the water levels at Yucca Mountain have not decreased due to pumping, lO
The Department of Energy has an argument for an implied reserved right
to water at Yucca Mountain on the basis of the site's designation by Congress
and because the NWPA must be read to reserve water to fulfill its purpose.
However, this argument would be strengthened by a formal withdrawal and
reservation of land and water at Yucca Mountain. If a reserved right is found,
the Department of Energy will not be required to pursue water applications
through the Nevada State Engineer. In fact, the State of Nevada would have no
authority over the reserved water located at the Yucca Mountain site. Unfortu-
nately for the Department of Energy, it is unlikely that Congress or the Presi-
dent will expressly reserve water at Yucca Mountain due to the political
climate, and a century's worth of deference to state water law.
V. FEDERAL NON-RESERVED WATER RIGHTS DOCTRINE
Federal non-reserved water rights is another avenue for the Department of
Energy to acquire the necessary water for Yucca Mountain. The doctrine is
premised on the Supremacy Clause and could be invoked regardless of whether
the land at Yucca Mountain has been reserved from the public domain. Non-
reserved rights claim the minimum amount of water necessary subject to prior
appropriations. The doctrine, in essence, is a compromise between the reserva-
tion doctrine and the total deference to state water regulation.
The existence of federal non-reserved water rights has been seriously
debated. Three successive solicitors from the Department of Interior have
opined on the subject. In 1979, Solicitor Krulitz defined a broad federal doc-
trine that allowed federal agencies, "in the absence of an explicit congressional
directive to the contrary," to claim and use required unappropriated water in
spite of state law.1 °5 However, Krulitz's broad view seemed to run counter to
dicta in United States v. New Mexico.' 0 6 The next solicitor, Martz, did not
expressly repudiate Krulitz's view of non-reserved water rights, although Martz
'o U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, Site
Environmental Report for Calendar Year 2000 Yucca Mountain Site Nye County, Nevada,
PGM-MGR-EC-000001, Rev. 00 (August 2001).
105 Theodore B. Olson, Federal "Non-Reserved" Water Rights, 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel
328, 331 (1982).
106 New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 701 stating:
Where water is necessary to fulfill the very purposes for which a federal reservation was created,
it is reasonable to conclude, even in the face of Congress' express deference to state water law in
other areas, that the United States intended to reserve the necessary water. Where water is only
valuable for a secondary use of the reservation, however, there arises the contrary inference that
Congress intended, consistent with its other views, that the United States would acquire water in
the same manner as any other public or private appropriator.
See also GOULD & GRANT, supra note 75.
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did try to define and restrict its broad application.1"7 Martz indicated that the
non-reserved right could exist if expressly or impliedly mandated by Con-
gress.108 However, the two acts he analyzed did not manifest such a clear
expression."19 Both views by Krulitz and Martz provoked heated resistance by
western Governors." 0  In response to the upheaval in the West,"' Solicitor
Coldiron issued an opinion that clearly dispelled the positions of Krulitz and
Martz. In fact, Coldiron specifically stated "[t]here is no 'federal non reserved
water right."'' 2
Because of the discord among the successive solicitors on the subject of
non-reserved rights, Assistant Attorney General from the Office of Legal Coun-
sel, Theodore Olson, wrote a comprehensive memorandum on the "federal gov-
ernment's legal rights to unappropriated water arising on or flowing across
federally owned lands in the western states.""' 3 Olson did not rule out the
possible existence of a non-reserved water right, but summarized the opinion
by stating that there has never been an exercise of such authority." 4 Olson did
state that the commerce clause, property clause, and supremacy clause gave the
federal government authority to preempt state law." 5 Similar to Martz, Olson
indicated that an exercise of the supremacy clause would have to be "explicit or
clearly implied, however, and federal rights to water will not be found simply
by virtue of the ownership, occupation, or use of federal land."
'
"1 6
The Great Sand Dunes National Park and Preserve Act of 2000 is an
example of the explicit exercise of federal supremacy called for by Olsen.'" 7
Within the act, the Clinton Administration used the non-reserved rights doc-
trine to appropriate, not reserve, the necessary amount of water to support a
national park and preserve in southern Colorado." 8  This action is the
1o7 Supra note 105, at 360.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 John D. Leshy, Water Rights for New Federal Land Conservation Programs: A Turn-of-
the-Century Evaluation, 4 U. DENY. WATER L. REV. 271, 287 (2001).
"I Supra note 105, at 356.
112 Id. at 360.
113 Id. at 328.
114 Id. at 382-83.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Pub. L. No. 106-530, 114(9)(b)(2) Stat. 2527 (2000).
118 Id. stating:
WATER RIGHTS FOR NATIONAL PARK AND NATIONAL PRESERVE. In carrying out
this Act, the Secretary shall obtain and exercise any water rights required to fulfill the purposes
of the national park and the national preserve in accordance with the following provisions:
(A) Such water rights shall be appropriated, adjudicated, changed, and administered pursuant to
the procedural requirements and priority system of the laws of the State of Colorado.
(B) The purposes and other substantive characteristics of such water rights shall be established
pursuant to State law, except that the Secretary is specifically authorized to appropriate
water under this Act exclusively for the purposes of maintaining ground water levels, sur-
face water levels, and stream flows on, across, and under the national park and national
preserve, in order to accomplish the purposes of the national park and the national preserve
and to protect park resources and park uses.
(C) Such water rights shall be established and used without interfering with -
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fulfillment of Olson's twenty-year-old opinion." 9
In the case of Yucca Mountain, there is no doubt that Congress or the
President could expressly appropriate water via the non-reserved rights doc-
trine. The question is, however, whether Section 124 of the NWPA - Consid-
eration and Effect of Acquisition of Water Rights - can be read to clearly imply
such an appropriation.1 20  Within this section, the Secretary of Energy is
directed to consider the adverse effects associated with the acquisition of water
for the development and construction of a repository. 21 The Secretary is also
empowered to mitigate any adverse effects.' 22 This language supports the Sec-
retary of Energy's authority to acquire (appropriate) water necessary for the
development, construction, and operation of a repository. Such appropriation
would, of course, be cautioned by potential adverse effects. 123 However, John
D. Leshy, former Solicitor of the Department of Interior, suggests that states
have not been adversely impacted by the exercise of federal reservation or
appropriation of water.124  Additionally, as discussed earlier, the State of
Nevada has not demonstrated or even claimed any adverse impacts, and on-site
well studies have shown no decrease in water level due to use at the Yucca
Mountain site.
The non-reserved rights doctrine should be viewed by Nevada as a com-
promise, and a reconciliation tool with the federal government. The doctrine,
as summarized by Leshy, encourages cooperation between the state and federal
interest. 125 Unfortunately, the state of Nevada is using water law as a tool to
block a politically unpopular federal project, and will continue to resist cooper-
ation with the federal government to the detriment of Nevada's citizens.
(i) any exercise of water right in existence on the date of enactment of this Act for a non-
Federal purpose in the San Luis Valley, Colorado; and
(ii) the closed Basin Division, San Luis Valley Project.
(D) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d), no Federal reservation of water may be
claimed or established for the national park or the national preserve.
119 Supra note 110, at 288.
120 42 U.S.C. § 10144 (2000).
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Supra note 110, at 281.
125 Id. at 288-89, stating:
National interests are protected because the federal government holds an enforceable water right
in its own name, and federal, not state law measures the substance of the right. This means the
standard by which the fight is quantified and adjudicated is one of the federal law which, like the
quantification and adjudication of a traditional federal reserved fight, is ultimately reviewable by
the Supreme Court of the United States.
State interests are protected because the federal agency has to file for the right and, thus, the
right may be adjudicated and administered in the state water administration system, and in accor-
dance with the state priority system. Both sides are served by the fact that the uncertainty over
the contours of the fight may be resolved relatively promptly, without the need to wait decades
for a general stream adjudication. And, more subtly, both sides are served because this approach
compels them to cooperate more closely, which may foster better communications between, and
more confidence in, each other.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The DOE has several alternatives to thwart the State of Nevada's attempts,
via water law, to prevent the construction of the Nation's first high-level radio-
active waste repository at Yucca Mountain. First, the DOE should continue to
pursue declaratory and permanent injunctive relief on the basis of presidential,
congressional, and the NWPA's preemptive effect. Second, the DOE should
aggressively pursue a formal land withdrawal, which explicitly reserves the
necessary water to fulfill the primary purposes of the reservation: construction
and operation of a repository. Finally, the President or Congress could explic-
itly appropriate, rather than reserve, the required quantity of non-reserved
water. By pursuing one or more of these alternatives, the DOE will be able to
put the water law issues surrounding Yucca Mountain to rest and focus its
attention on more important design, safety, and licensing issues.
The Ninth Circuit in Morros has described the elements and analysis nec-
essary for the DOE to succeed on the merits of Nevada water law standing as
an obstacle to the performance of congressionally mandated duties outlined in
the NWPA. Nevada failed to successfully veto Yucca Mountain according to
the congressionally prescribed method. Additionally, based on Yucca Moun-
tain being designated as the site for a repository by Congress and the President,
the State of Nevada's attempt to administratively and legislatively veto Yucca
Mountain will be preempted. The courts simply cannot allow a state to unilat-
erally overrule the concerted effort of Congress and the President, thereby
usurping federal authority.
The Department of Energy does have an implied reserved right to water at
Yucca Mountain on the basis of the site's designation by Congress and the
President. While the NWPA can easily be read to provide the Secretary of
Energy the authority to reserve the necessary water to fulfill the purposes out-
lined in the NWPA, a formal land withdrawal that explicitly reserves the
required water would solidify the DOE's claim to reserved water rights. How-
ever, given the federal government's long pattern of deference to state water
law, it is unlikely that the United States will rely on the reserved right while
other alternatives exist to resolve this matter.
There is no question that the President and Congress hold the authority to
appropriate non-reserved water, contrary to state law. Until the Clinton
Administration, such authority was only theory and had not been exercised.
Following the example used in Colorado, the President could again invoke the
supremacy clause to appropriate the required water for construction and opera-
tion of a repository at Yucca Mountain. While this third alternative is relatively
untested, it has the potential to serve as a reconciliation tool where the State of
Nevada works with the federal government to solve this important issue.
What is ironic about the extended conflict between Nevada and the DOE
is that the arid nature of Nevada was one of the motivating factors in selecting
Yucca Mountain for characterization as a potential site for a high-level radioac-
tive waste repository. Nevada is the driest state in the nation, yet water is the
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very issue that is responsible for delaying progress on Yucca Mountain. As
was seen during the course of this conflict, the required water exists and water
law truly is the "weed that flowers in the arid west."
' 126
126 Harrison, supra note 4, at 173 (quoting Ninth Circuit Judge Fletcher in United States v.
Orr Water Ditch Co., 256 F.3d 935, 940 (2001)).
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